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In this paper, we document and attempt to explain diﬀerences between
the U.S. and U.K. household wealth distributions, with an emphasis on the
quite diﬀerent portfolios held in stock and housing equities in the two
countries. As a proportion of their total wealth, British households hold
relatively small amounts of ﬁnancial assets—including equities in stock—
compared to American households. In contrast, British households ap-
pear to move into home ownership at relatively young ages, and a large
fraction of their household wealth is concentrated in housing. Finally, the
age gradient in home equity appears to be much steeper in the United
Kingdom whereas U.S. households exhibit a steeper age gradient in stock
equity.
Moreover, these portfolio diﬀerences between the two countries are not
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disclaimer applies.temporally static, as important changes have been taking place in both
countries in their housing and equity markets. Especially in Britain, there
have been some fundamental changes in national policies that have been
aimed at encouraging wider rates of home ownership and greater partici-
pation in the equity market.
As well as large volatility in real rates of return in housing and corporate
equity markets, the last few decades have also witnessed periods of unusu-
ally large capital gains in both the housing and stock market. Besides the
large background risk in their incomes, young householders in Britain and
the United States face considerable housing price and stock price risks
when deciding on their desired portfolio balances. While price risk in the
equity market appears to be historically similar in the two countries, hous-
ing price risk may be much higher in the United Kingdom in recent de-
cades.
In addition, institutional diﬀerences between the countries imply much
younger new home buyers in the United Kingdom than in the United
States. In this paper, we argue that the higher housing price volatility in the
United Kingdom combined with much younger entry into home owner-
ship is an important factor accounting for the relatively small participation
of young British householders in the stock market. We show it is important
to acknowledge the dual role of housing—providing both wealth and con-
sumption services—in understanding wealth accumulation diﬀerences be-
tween the United States and the United Kingdom. Institutional diﬀer-
ences, particularly in housing markets, that aﬀect the demand and supply
of housing services turn out to be important in generating portfolio diﬀer-
ences between the two countries. In particular, these diﬀerences in housing
price risk imply steeper life-cycle accumulations in housing and less steep
accumulations in stock equity over the life cycle in the United Kingdom.
This paper is divided into six sections. The ﬁrst describes the data
sources used, whereas section 5.2 presents some basic facts about the dis-
tribution of total wealth as well as the housing and ﬁnancial asset compo-
nents that make up that total. The third section highlights some salient
diﬀerences between British and American housing and equity markets.
The next section summarizes some theoretical reasons why young British
people may desire not to hold much of their household wealth in the form
of corporate equity. Section 5.5 tests some implications of this theoretical
perspective using comparative international data on the characteristics of
young homeowners. The ﬁnal section summarizes our conclusions.
5.1 Data Sources
To make wealth comparisons, for the United States we primarily use the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), which has gathered almost
thirty years of extensive economic and demographic data on a nationally
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individuals who live in those families. Unlike many other prominent Amer-
ican wealth surveys, the PSID is representative of the complete age distri-
bution. Wealth modules were included in the 1984, 1989, 1994, and 1999
waves of the PSID and all four waves are examined here. In addition, ques-
tions on housing ownership, value, and mortgage were asked in each cal-
endar year wave of the PSID.
For the United Kingdom, we use the British Household Panel Survey
(BHPS). The BHPS has been running annually since 1991 and, like the
PSID, is also representative of the complete age distribution. The wave 1
sample consisted of some 5,500 households and 10,300 individuals, and
continuing representativeness of the survey is maintained by following
panel members wherever they move in the United Kingdom and also by in-
cluding in the panel the new members of households formed by original
panel members.
The BHPS contains annual information on individual and household in-
come and employment as well as a complete set of demographic variables.
Data are collected annually on primary housing wealth and occasionally
on secondary housing wealth and vehicle wealth. In 1995 the BHPS in-
cluded an individual wealth module which forms the basis of the wealth in-
formation used here. Since some components of wealth are collected at the
household level, we construct a household wealth deﬁnition from wave 5 to
use in what follows. Hence we draw a subsample of BHPS households for
whom the head and the spouse (where relevant) remain present and who
successfully complete the 1995 wealth module. This results in a total of
4,688 households observed in the panel for between one and eight waves.
Appendix table 5A.1 contains a side-by-side account of the elements
that comprise household wealth in the two surveys. Besides housing equity,
PSID nonhousing assets are divided into seven categories: other real estate
(which includes any second home); vehicles; farm or business ownership;
stocks, mutual funds, investment trusts, and stocks held in individual re-
tirement accounts (IRAs); checking and savings accounts, certiﬁcates of
deposit (CDs), treasury bills, savings bonds, and liquid assets in IRAs;
bonds, trusts, life insurance, and other assets; and other debts. The PSID
wealth modules include transaction questions about purchases and sales
so that active and passive (capital gain) saving can be distinguished.
While the BHPS detail on assets is similar to the PSID, there are some
diﬀerences. Most important, no questions were asked about business eq-
uity in the BHPS. To make wealth concepts as comparable as possible,
business equity was excluded from total wealth in the PSID.1Neither survey
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1. To the extent that omitted components vary across countries, and particularly for groups
converting business wealth to personal wealth, these may be important issues that deserve
further investigation. Given that the majority of our analysis will be most pertinent to young
households, however, pension wealth will be important only in the context of long-termoversamples high income or wealth households, which—given the extreme
skew in the wealth distribution—implies that both surveys understate the
concentration of wealth among the extremely wealthy. While this lack of a
high wealth oversample is typically a limitation in describing wealth dis-
tributions, it has the advantage here of greater comparability between the
data sets. Another limitation common to both countries is that neither pro-
vides any measure of private pension or government pension wealth.
There are also diﬀerences in the way ﬁnancial asset wealth was collected.
Both surveys collect wealth information in four broad classes, but the
classes are somewhat diﬀerent in each country. The PSID uses checking ac-
counts, stocks, other saving (predominantly bonds), and debts, whereas
the BHPS uses bank accounts, savings accounts, investments, and debts.
For each of the BHPS classes, there are also a series of dummy variables
recording whether each individual has funds in a particular component of
each category. In addition, for investments a variable records which of the
various subcomponents is the largest.
The following procedure makes the wealth categories as comparable as
possible when disaggregated data are necessary. Bank and savings accounts
are aggregated in the BHPS. The investments category is subdivided as fol-
lows: For individuals who report no ownership of either national savings
bonds, national savings certiﬁcates, or premium bonds, we code their entire
investment wealth as shares (27 percent who report owning investment
wealth). For those who report no share ownership, mutual funds, personal
equity plans or “other” investments, we code the investment wealth as
bonds (44 percent of those with investment wealth). For those reporting
both “types” of investment wealth (28 percent, we allocate wealth entirely
to either shares or bonds, according to asset type of the largest asset.
Finally, an issue of comparability arises over the unit of assessment to
which the wealth module applies. More speciﬁcally, it is not possible to get
a single estimate of household wealth in any subcategory of ﬁnancial
wealth from the BHPS. This is because every individual was asked to com-
plete the wealth questionnaire and having reported a total amount for, say,
investments was simply asked “Are any of your investments jointly held
with someone else?” This framework creates obvious problems in generat-
ing a measure of household wealth. We address this issue by using a bound-
ing approach. For each of the ﬁnancial wealth categories in the BHPS, two
measures are reported. First, we compute an upper bound under the as-
sumption that any jointly held asset classes are actually held solely by the
individual (the limit of the case where the individual owns “most” of the as-
set). Second, we compute a lower bound under the assumption that an in-
dividual only owns 1/Nth of the asset class in which joint ownership is re-
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saving. As such, it will be relatively small in present discounted value terms, relatively safe,
and important for us, inaccessible for short- or medium-run smoothing purposes. Hence in
what follows we do not control for what pension diﬀerences there are across countries.ported, where N is the number of adults in the household. To compute the
upper bound of net ﬁnancial wealth, we add the upper bounds for the as-
set components and subtract the lower bound of the debt component and
vice versa for the lower bound. In this paper, both lower- and upper-bound
estimates are presented. Fortunately, our conclusions appear not be sensi-
tive to how this problem is resolved, and the availability of individual-level
wealth holdings will be an advantage for certain later aspects of our anal-
ysis.
5.2 Comparing the Wealth Distribution in the United States and Britain
We describe here the main characteristics of wealth distributions in the
United Kingdom and United States, highlighting similarities and diﬀer-
ences. We use two concepts of household wealth—total household wealth
(excluding business equity) and total ﬁnancial assets. Since the BHPS
wealth module was only ﬁelded in 1995, we conﬁne our cross-section com-
parisons to the 1994 wave of the PSID. To deal with currency diﬀerences,
the U.K. data (collected in September 1995) are converted into U.S. dollars
using the then exchange rate of 1.5525, and all ﬁnancial statistics for both
countries are presented in 1995 U.S. dollars.2
Table 5.1 lists mean values of wealth and its components for both coun-
tries. Total household wealth is about one-third higher in the United
States, but within-asset category diﬀerences are far larger. Total nonﬁnan-
cial assets held by households are reasonably similar in the United King-
dom and United States. Within that subaggregate, British households ac-
tually have greater absolute and relative amounts of wealth in home equity
than American households do. Converted to a common currency, mean
housing equity is almost $10,000 more than their American counterparts.
Similarly, British households hold 62 percent of their total household
wealth as home equity: The comparable percent for American households
is only 34 percent.
The other striking diﬀerence between the United Kingdom and United
States lies instead in ﬁnancial wealth where mean values in America are
more than twice those in Britain. These diﬀerences exist in all components
of ﬁnancial wealth, but they are particularly large in stock market equity.
On average, in the mid-1990s American households owned about $20,000
more in corporate equity than their British counterparts.
Given the extreme skew in wealth distributions, means can be poor sum-
mary statistics for wealth. In a previous paper (Banks, Blundell, and Smith
2000), we have shown that total net wealth and ﬁnancial wealth distribu-
tions in both countries were extremely unequally distributed. Turning to
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2. Given that this is close to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) purchasing power parity (PPP) conversion rates for this time (1.55 in 1994 and 1.53
in 1995) our comparisons are unaﬀected by the use of exchange rate as opposed to PPP con-
version factors.diﬀerences between countries, large diﬀerences did not emerge for the typ-
ical household. Median total net worth was slightly higher among British
households, whereas median ﬁnancial assets were somewhat greater
among American households. Rather, the critical diﬀerences lie in the up-
per tails of the wealth distribution, especially in ﬁnancial assets. No mat-
ter which assumption about joint or separate ownership of assets is made
in the BHPS, the top ﬁfth of American households have considerably more
ﬁnancial wealth than the top ﬁfth of British households. The between
country discrepancy in ﬁnancial wealth expands rapidly as we move up the
respective ﬁnancial wealth distributions.
These wealth diﬀerences are not due to age and income diﬀerences be-
tween the countries. Banks, Blundell, and Smith (2000) demonstrate that,
within age groups, net ﬁnancial wealth in both countries increases with
household income albeit in a highly nonlinear way and that at almost all
points in the age–income distribution, U.S. households are holding more
ﬁnancial wealth than their U.K. counterparts. The same breakdown for net
total wealth shows that for almost all of the younger age–income groups,
U.K. households have at least as much wealth, if not slightly more, than
their U.S. counterparts.
5.3 A Comparison of Four Markets—Housing and Stock Markets 
in the United States and the United Kingdom
To set a background for this paper, we ﬁrst describe the most salient
trends in housing and equity markets in these two countries during the last
few decades. Our description includes trends and diﬀerences in rates of
ownership, rates of return, and amounts of wealth held in these forms.
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Table 5.1 Household Wealth and Components in the United States and the 
United Kingdom (1995 US$, thousands)
1995 BHPS
Wealth Category 1994 PSID Lower Upper
Net Home Equity 44.8 54.3 54.3
Other Real Estate 24.2 9.5 9.5
Net Vehicle Wealth 10.9 3.8 3.8
Net Tangible Assets 79.9 67.7 67.7
Stocks and Mutual Funds 28.8 7.7 10.3
Liquid Assets 19.5 10.0 12.8
Other Financial Assets 9.5 4.7 5.2
Other Debts 6.1 1.6 2.0
Net Financial Assets 51.7 19.4 26.7
Total Wealth 131.6 87.2 94.45.3.1 Rates of Asset Ownership: Housing
Table 5.2lists the proportion of households who are homeowners, by the
age of head of household, for selected years in both countries. While ag-
gregate rates of home ownership are now not that dissimilar (around two-
thirds in both countries in the most recent year listed), there are striking
diﬀerences by age.3 Home ownership rates amongst young households are
far higher in the United Kingdom than in the United States, with diﬀer-
ences as big as 20 percentage points for householders between the ages of
twenty and twenty-nine. While not as large, the fraction of households aged
thirty–thirty-nine is currently double digit larger in the United Kingdom.
The oﬀset to the greater rates of home ownership among young British
householders is the much lower historical rates among older households in
the United Kingdom. For example, among those over age sixty, the preva-
lence of owning a home in 1984 was more than 20 percentage points larger
in the United States than in the United Kingdom.
Table 5.2 also suggests that there are stronger cyclic and trend eﬀects on
home ownership rates in the United Kingdom compared to the United
States. Although the levels are always above their U.S. counterparts, there
was a sharp upswing in home ownership among the youngest British
household heads (those between the ages of twenty and twenty-nine),
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Table 5.2 Proportion of Households Who are Homeowners in Year t, by Age of the Head
Age Range 1969 1974 1979 1984 1989 1994 1997 1999
United Kingdom
20–29 0.418 0.456 0.508 0.537 0.518 0.489 0.424
30–39 0.529 0.596 0.648 0.692 0.729 0.688 0.669
40–49 0.476 0.568 0.615 0.718 0.772 0.787 0.755
50–59 0.476 0.489 0.517 0.631 0.711 0.770 0.779
60–69 0.446 0.443 0.490 0.527 0.624 0.702 0.722
70  0.411 0.419 0.425 0.486 0.553 0.585 0.615
Total 0.465 0.498 0.537 0.603 0.655 0.676 0.673
United States
20–29 0.326 0.310 0.288 0.246 0.233 0.272 0.277
30–39 0.604 0.661 0.665 0.590 0.530 0.528 0.530
40–49 0.737 0.751 0.760 0.738 0.766 0.704 0.695
50–59 0.700 0.770 0.778 0.806 0.799 0.811 0.810
60–69 0.785 0.736 0.756 0.776 0.796 0.830 0.870
70  0.639 0.751 0.760 0.681 0.699 0.717 0.770
Total 0.639 0.631 0.624 0.601 0.609 0.626 0.651
3. Figures for the United Kingdom are computed from the FES microdata to enable the
comparison with 1985. However, calculations conﬁrm that home ownership rates in the 1995
BHPS data match those in the 1995 FES to well within 1 percentage point for all age groups
and for the population as a whole.which reached its peak between 1984 and 1988, during the height of a hous-
ing boom. Since that year, the trend reversed, and the proportion of home-
owners amongst the youngest group in the United Kingdom fell. With
lower amplitude, a similar pattern exists among those aged thirty–thirty-
nine. We return below to the question of why cyclic variation in home own-
ership may be larger in the United Kingdom.
There are impressive cohort eﬀects in U.K. home ownership with secu-
lar changes concentrated among older households. For example, among
British households aged ﬁfty–ﬁfty-nine, home ownership rates increased
by almost 30 percentage points after 1974. While not conﬁned to that time
period, the size of the increase in home ownership is largest in the ﬁve-year
interval between 1979 and 1984.
Table 5.3 presents the same data separately for U.K. households based
on whether the head had some postcompulsory education. This dramatic
secular increase in home ownership in Britain is concentrated among those
with less education. Once again examining those aged ﬁfty–ﬁfty-nine,
there was a 32 percentage point increase in home ownership among those
with no post-compulsory schooling compared to a 12 percentage point in-
crease among those households whose head had moved beyond compul-
sory schooling levels.
The structure of these diﬀerences in home ownership between the
United Kingdom and United States raise several questions. One question
is what accounted for the magnitude and structure of the dramatic secular
shift in the United Kingdom. Given its timing, one contributing factor is
the “right-to-buy” scheme for public housing tenants that was introduced
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Table 5.3 U.K. Home Ownership Rates by Age, Year, and Schooling Level of Head
Age Range 1979 1984 1989 1994 1999
No Post Compulsory Education
20–29 0.384 0.450 0.468 0.421 0.341
30–39 0.526 0.567 0.590 0.598 0.596
40–49 0.515 0.645 0.681 0.680 0.679
50–59 0.413 0.540 0.648 0.699 0.739
60–69 0.410 0.447 0.549 0.634 0.680
70  0.376 0.425 0.454 0.471 0.583
Total 0.436 0.508 0.559 0.579 0.622
With Post Compulsory Education
20–29 0.617 0.677 0.623 0.594 0.525
30–39 0.814 0.803 0.844 0.795 0.767
40–49 0.792 0.842 0.874 0.861 0.868
50–59 0.766 0.802 0.826 0.865 0.887
60–69 0.729 0.736 0.788 0.828 0.916
70  0.660 0.689 0.793 0.802 0.816
Total 0.735 0.771 0.807 0.803 0.785in 1980. Under this scheme those households who had been renting in gov-
ernment owned housing for a certain minimum duration were given an au-
tomatic right to buy their home from the local authorities. The house was
valued at current market value but discounts, varying between 30 percent
and 60 percent, were applied according to how long they had been living
there.
The right-to-buy program is consistent with the main features of the
data in tables 5.2 and 5.3. Most important, public housing tenants are con-
centrated among the less educated where most of the increase in home
ownership occurred. Secondly, the concentration of change was among
middle-age and older households who had longer tenure and could meet
the minimum tenure requirement and who also may have accumulated a bit
of savings for a down payment.
The more diﬃcult question arising from table 5.2, and one on which we
focus in this paper, is why rates of home ownership are much higher among
younger U.K. households. One possibility is the structure of mortgages
themselves. The typical U.K. model is characterized by a low down pay-
ment (5 percent to 10 percent), variable interest rates, and a fairly low take-
up of mortgage interest insurance. The typical U.S. mortgage has a higher
down payment (20 percent), ﬁxed interest rates,4and often is accompanied
by mortgage interest insurance, generating a more stable intertemporal
ﬁnancial commitment (see Chiuri and Jappelli 2000) for an institutional
diﬀerences discussion). Diﬀerences in down payment requirements alone
shorten the time (compared to American households) it takes young
British households to save in order to reach their required down pay-
ments.5
Diﬀerences in housing wealth accumulation could be driven by other
factors in the housing market. Rental market rigidities or failures com-
monly thought to exist in the United Kingdom could be one issue. Renters’
right rules are far more common in the United Kingdom, making it diﬃ-
cult to evict existing tenants. This may explain diﬀerences in ownership
rates among the young but not diﬀerences in the amount and growth of net
equity in housing held by homeowners. The low ownership rates among
older British most likely lie in a combination of the widespread availability
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4. In the 1996 PSID sample, only 20.8 percent of households with mortgages had variable
rate mortgages.
5. The role of cross-country diﬀerences in tax treatment is interesting since the U.S. tax
treatment is actually more favorable than in the United Kingdom. While mortgage interest
payments had been tax deductible in the United Kingdom, over the past twenty years this has
been gradually phased out and all tax relief has been abolished from April 2000. U.S. house-
holds still receive full tax deductibility on all mortgage interest payments. Capital gains on
primary residences are untaxed in both countries. These tax diﬀerences may aﬀect ownership
rates and equity payments diﬀerently. Importantly, there is no tax advantage to carrying
mortgage debt in the United Kingdom, whereas this advantage is substantial in the United
States.of public housing to their generations as well as their much lower levels of
economic status compared to U.S. households.
Tables 5.4and 5.5provide another view of the housing market dynamics
in the two countries by listing yearly values of home values and outstand-
ing mortgages for homeowners.6 The value of British homes is always
above that of their American counterparts. For example, in 1994 the me-
dian value of a home in the United Kingdom is about 14 percent higher
than the median value of a home in the United States. Unless one has a
strong prior that British homes are in some sense “better” than American
homes, this price diﬀerential may simply indicate that the price of housing
is higher in the United Kingdom. If so, the advantage of British households
in housing wealth raises some conceptual questions of whether this type of
wealth advantage should be treated on a par with wealth diﬀerences that
emerge in other assets. If British homes are more expensive for the same
quality, and demand is inelastic, British households will spend more on
housing as discussed in section 5.4.
Tables 5.4 and 5.5 also indicate that the higher net equity held in British
homes in part reﬂects higher housing prices in the United Kingdom but
also the smaller outstanding mortgages in the United Kingdom. This mort-
gage diﬀerential prevails in spite of the fact that initial down payment re-
quirements are lower in the United Kingdom than in the United States.
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Table 5.4 PSID Housing Equity and Its Components: Homeowners Only
(1984–1996; in thousands of 1995 US$)
Mortgage
Outstanding House Value
Year Mean Median Mean Median Net Equity Mean
1984 94.1 78.1 25.8 11.4 68.3
1985 97.6 82.3 27.6 11.0 70.0
1986 101.8 80.4 28.4 11.4 73.4
1987 108.4 84.0 31.1 12.9 77.3
1988 112.6 80.9 33.2 13.4 79.4
1989 115.6 83.4 35.3 14.3 80.3
1990 115.3 79.8 35.2 15.4 80.1
1991 110.6 79.3 34.8 14.3 75.8
1992 109.5 80.4 35.0 12.9 74.5
1993 112.0 83.5 38.4 15.6 73.6
1994 114.7 86.9 42.0 14.8 72.7
1995 114.5 90.0 39.7 15.0 74.8
1996 116.0 88.2 39.9 15.7 76.1
6. Over the years in common the time series of home values among homeowners in table 5.3
captures the swings in home prices contained in ﬁgure 5.3. No questions were asked in the
BHPS about housing in 1992, and no mortgage questions were asked in 1991.This in turn suggests that compared to their U.S. counterparts, British
households may not engage in signiﬁcant amounts of reﬁnancing their
homes as real housing prices rise and capital gains are accumulated. Con-
sistent with this view, note the signiﬁcant increase in outstanding mort-
gages in the United States at a pace that parallels that of real housing prices
so that net housing equity has remained ﬂat. While the reﬁnancing of
homes has become reasonably commonplace in the United States over the
last decade or so (data from the 1996 PSID indicate that 37 percent of
households with existing mortgages had reﬁnanced), this phenomenon ap-
pears to be much less important in the United Kingdom. British house-
holds seem to be far more cautious in using wealth accumulated through
capital gains in housing for other purposes.
5.3.2 Rates of Asset Ownership: Stock
Using the PSID, one-quarter of U.S. households directly owned some
stock in 1984, a fraction that grows to 40 percent by 1999. Direct share
ownership was far less common among British households, especially in
the early 1980s. Figure 5.1 plots the time-series pattern of equity owner-
shipin the United Kingdom between 1978 and 1996. By the mid-1980s,
British household equity ownership rates had been stable and hovered just
below 10 percent—well less than the U.S. ﬁgure in 1984. Starting in 1984,
equity ownership grew more rapidly in the United Kingdom than in the
United States. While the gap in equity ownership has narrowed, by the
mid-1990s almost one-quarter of British households directly owned stock
compared to one-third of American households.
Table 5.6 lists stock ownership rates by age in a form similar to that dis-
played in tables 5.4 and 5.5. Consistent with ﬁgure 5.1, secular changes in
British stock ownership look much like classic calendar year eﬀects. There
Wealth Portfolios in the United Kingdom and the United States 215
Table 5.5 BHPS Housing Equity and Its Components: Homeowners Only
(1991–1998; in thousands of 1995 US$)
Mortgage
Outstanding House Value
Year Mean Median Mean Median Net Equity Mean
1991 137.8 112.9 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1993 122.3 98.9 34.4 13.2 88.0
1994 120.0 96.7 34.4 14.5 85.6
1995 115.2 93.2 34.9 18.6 80.2
1996 117.6 95.8 32.9 16.7 84.7
1997 119.4 95.4 37.8 20.5 81.6
1998 124.5 99.6 35.5 19.9 89.0
Note: n.a.   not available.was almost no change between 1979 and 1984, followed by a sharp increase
during the next ﬁve years with very little change thereafter. These increases
in stock ownership were slightly larger among middle-age households, but
in general one is struck by the near uniformity in increases in prevalence
across all age groups. Not shown in table 5.6, stock ownership expanded by
a somewhat greater amount among more educated British households.7
The same questions asked about home ownership are relevant to equity
markets as well. Why the intercountry diﬀerences, and why the massive sec-
ular shifts in the United Kingdom? In the United Kingdom most of this in-
crease was concentrated in a four-year period from 1985 to 1989, coincid-
ing with the ﬂotation of previously nationalized public utilities such as
British Telecom (1984) and British Gas (1986). Around this time, the U.K.
government introduced also a further set of measures aimed at promoting
a “share-owning democracy”—namely tax-favored employee share owner-
ship schemes. In the United States the increase in share ownership was more
gradual throughout the 1980s, no doubt induced by rising rates of return.
One result of these trends was that although the stock market boom was rel-
atively similar across the countries, the fraction of American households
beneﬁting was far higher than in Britain throughout the 1980s and 1990s.
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Fig. 5.1 Time series of household share-ownership rates from FES data
7. For example, between 1984 and 1989, stock ownership rates increased by 11 percentage
points among those who stopped at the compulsory schooling level while it increased by 17
percentage points among household heads with more than a compulsory school education.The diﬀerences between the two countries in stock ownership are again
more diﬃcult to answer. One possible explanation is that market condi-
tions, in particular transaction costs, taxes, or information, diﬀer across
the two countries. Certainly prior to the mid-1980s in Britain there was a
tax bias away from direct holdings of equity toward wealth held in housing
or occupational pensions, because equity was more heavily taxed than
consumption, and housing and pensions beneﬁted from tax advantages
relative to consumption. Given the structure of the tax system these diﬀer-
ences were signiﬁcantly greater in times of high inﬂation.8 However, the
introduction of personal equity plans and employee share ownership
schemes meant that, from 1987 onward, equity could be held in a more fa-
vorably taxed manner by British households. Indeed, personal equity plans
give holdings of equity an identical tax treatment to IRAs or 401(k)s, that
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Table 5.6 Proportion of Households Who are Stock Owners, by Year and Age of
the Head
Age 1979 1984 1989 1994 1999
United Kingdom
20–29 0.032 0.032 0.102 0.119 0.113
30–39 0.054 0.051 0.187 0.174 0.211
40–49 0.087 0.076 0.262 0.237 0.258
50–59 0.103 0.127 0.312 0.276 0.333
60–69 0.126 0.110 0.288 0.293 0.351
70  0.109 0.111 0.205 0.236 0.283
Total 0.086 0.086 0.277 0.222 0.262
United States
20–29 0.144 0.160 0.188 .230
30–39 0.262 0.258 0.310 .350
40–49 0.306 0.358 0.409 .412
50–59 0.340 0.374 0.473 .486
60–69 0.288 0.336 0.416 .456
70  0.208 0.247 0.271 .399
Total 0.248 0.279 0.341 .398
Source: U.K. data from Family Expenditure Survey (see Banks and Tanner 1999).
Note: Blank cells indicate not available.
8. For equity, interest income tax was levied on dividend income at the investor’s marginal
rate (which could be as high as 83 percent during the 1970s and 60 percent during the 1980s).
In addition, investment income over a certain threshold (around £2,000 per year in mid-
1970’s prices) was also subject to a 15 percent investment income surcharge, although this was
paid by only very few tax payers. Capital gains tax was levied on nominal capital gains until
1985 and then real gains after that date at a ﬂat rate of 30 percent. Since 1988 real capital gains
were taxed at the investor’s marginal income tax rate. Since 1983 the ceiling on which mort-
gage interest payments were tax exempt was ﬁxed in nominal terms, thus rapidly reducing the
tax advantage to housing relative to other assets. See Banks and Blundell (1994) for details.is, neutral with respect to consumption.9 These tax diﬀerences are dis-
cussed in section 5.4.
Another pertinent diﬀerence is stamp duty, where a 0.5 percent charge is
levied on all share transactions in the United Kingdom. But for infre-
quently traded portfolios, such a diﬀerence is unlikely to be behind the
marked diﬀerences in share ownership observed across the two countries.
Finally, there could be diﬀerences in the information individuals have
about stock market investment opportunities. While this is a plausible ex-
planation for diﬀerences in the middle of the income distribution, there are
cross-country diﬀerences even in the very highest percentiles of the income
or wealth distribution, where such information diﬀerences are unlikely to
be so pronounced.
An alternative explanation for these diﬀerences, and possibly for higher
accumulations of ﬁnancial wealth in America compared to most of Europe
(including the United Kingdom) more generally, involves diﬀerences in at-
titudes toward capitalist ﬁnancial institutions (see Banks, Blundell, and
Smith 2000). Especially during the 1970s and early 1980s, it is probably a
fair characterization that there was more distrust of the fairness of capital-
ism as an economic system, at least among signiﬁcant segments of the Eu-
ropean population. The stock market is one of most vivid capitalist sym-
bols, so this distrust may have resulted in lower average participation in
equity markets among Europeans. This could be one reason why the equity
boom that eventually occurred in the United Kingdom aﬀected fewer
households. However, the results obtained by Banks, Blundell, and Smith
(2000) suggest that only a part of the diﬀerences in equity ownership can
be explained by ideology diﬀerences between the countries.
If transaction costs, taxes, and ideology cannot fully explain the low rates
of stock ownership in the United Kingdom, where do we go from there? In
the following we provide a new explanation for these low rates of equity own-
ership that are founded not in the institutional character of the equity mar-
kets in the two countries but rather in diﬀerences in the two housing markets.
5.3.3 Rates of Return on Assets
Figure 5.2 plots inﬂation adjusted equity price indexes for both coun-
tries, each expressed relative to a 1980 base.10 The magnitude of the recent
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9. On direct holdings of equity or mutual funds held outside of personal equity plans
(PEPs) or IRAs, the tax treatment is also comparable across the United States and United
Kingdom. Dividend income is taxed as income in both countries, and realized capital gains
are taxable in both countries. However, in the United Kingdom capital gains are taxed only
above a fairly sizeable annual exemption (around $10,000 per year). In the United States cap-
ital gains are taxed at a rate lower than that in the United Kingdom (also varying with the
length of the time the asset is held, but with no exemption).
10. The U.S. index is the S&P500 while the U.K. index is the Financial Times All Share in-
dex. For an analysis of the impact of the American stock market on wealth distributions and



















sstock market boom in both countries is impressive even compared to his-
torical equity premiums. For example, real equity prices in the United
Kingdom are about two and one-half times larger in real terms in 1995 as
they were in 1980—slightly larger than the equity appreciation in the
United States over the same period. Yet, measured from this 1980 base, it
is remarkable how similar equity appreciation has been in both countries.
The U.S. equity rates of return would be higher than those in the United
Kingdom if the mid-1970s was used instead as the reference, suggesting
that up to 1980 the (recent) historical experience in the stock market was
more favorable in America. Still, the compelling message from ﬁgure 5.2 is
that diﬀerential rates of return in each country’s equity markets during the
1980s and 1990s cannot explain the quite diﬀerent levels of ﬁnancial wealth
holdings in each country by the mid-1990s.11
Similarly, ﬁgure 5.3 shows real indices of average house prices for the
United States and United Kingdom over the period 1974 to 1998. As with
the indices for equity returns, both series are normalized to unity in 1980.
Immediately apparent is the much larger volatility of housing prices in the
United Kingdom, with real prices rising by 50 percent over the period 1980
to 1989 and then falling back to its previous value by 1992. Over the period
as a whole, however, real returns were similar across the two countries and
much smaller than those realized in the equity market. In addition, the
highly volatile returns to housing equity and variable interest rates leaves
British households much exposed to business-cycle vagaries. This should
make them much more cautious than Americans would be of reﬁnancing
their homes during housing price upswings and converting the funds into
ﬁnancial assets.12
The U.K. index also hides considerable diﬀerences across regions, with
some being much more volatile than others. In table 5.7 we present sum-
mary statistics for house prices from the regional subindices, showing both
average house prices and average house price inﬂation over the period as a
whole, along with the corresponding variances. Immediately clear is that
London and the South East of England (in which almost 30 percent of
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11. For simplicity, our comparison relates to stock prices as opposed to stock returns, but
dividend yields are comparable or, if anything, higher in the United Kingdom, so this cannot
account for higher U.S. stock holdings (see Bond, Chennels, and Devereux 1995, for ex-
ample).
12. To this point we have discussed income, housing price, and stock price risk in isolation.
In deciding on the composition of their wealth portfolios, households will also consider the
correlation of these risks. This is a complicated subject, and we just scratch the surface here.
To examine how these risks are correlated over time, using yearly data we estimated in each
country correlations between the proportional change in real gross domestic product, pro-
portional changes in real house prices, and proportional changes in real stock prices. Pro-
portional changes were used to attempt to isolate the risk and eliminate the deterministic
component. In neither country is there any correlation between stock price risk and either
housing price or gross domestic product (GDP) risk, but a signiﬁcant positive correlation ex-
ists between housing price risk and GDP risk. Moreover, this correlation is signiﬁcantly
higher in the United Kingdom than in the United States, consistent with our view that hous-
ing supply elasticity is much smaller in the United Kingdom.U.K. households are located) face considerably higher volatility than the
average U.K. index. We return to this in the following.
5.3.4 Diﬀerences in Wealth Holdings in Housing and Stock
Intables 5.8and 5.9we report percentiles of net primary housing wealth
and stock wealth, in both the United States and the United Kingdom, by
home ownership and stock ownership status. Note that in this table and
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Fig. 5.3 Comparison of U.S. and U.K. housing prices
Table 5.7 Regional House Price Volatility in the United Kingdom, 1978–2000
Fraction of Average Real Variance of Average Real Variance of
Households in House Price Real House House Price Real House
Region Region (1995) (1980   1) Price Inﬂation Price  Inﬂation
Inner London 10.38 1.1386 0.3049 0.0280 0.0174
Outer London 1.1316 0.2860 0.0245 0.0156
South East 19.40 1.0974 0.2724 0.0209 0.0159
East Anglia 4.18 1.0645 0.2689 0.0164 0.0170
South West 9.11 1.0937 0.2368 0.0178 0.0128
East Midlands 7.47 1.0798 0.2092 0.0101 0.0118
West Midlands 9.45 1.0489 0.1917 0.0109 0.0107
North West 10.42 1.0394 0.1815 0.0120 0.0097
Yorkshire 8.91 0.9867 0.1473 0.0028 0.0115
Wales 4.99 0.9750 0.1327 0.0047 0.0130
North 6.32 1.0224 0.1217 0.0051 0.0073
Scotland 9.37 1.0021 0.0576 0.0041 0.0026
Source: Nationwide house price indices (1978q1–2000q2).those that follow, we use the upper bound of household stock wealth in the
United Kingdom. Because the United Kingdom has less stock wealth, if
anything, diﬀerences between the United States and the United Kingdom
will be underestimated. For all types of households the distribution of
wealth held in the form of primary housing is higher at each point in the
United Kingdom than in the United States, although the diﬀerences are
largest in the bottom three-quarters of the distribution.
In contrast, stock holdings are much higher among American house-
holds. In the mid-1990s, the mean value of shares in America was three
times as large as in Britain and was about twice as large when considering
shareholders only. In both countries, distributions of stock values are
highly skewed, with extreme concentrations in 5 to 10 percent of house-
holds. But at all points in the distributions, the value of American holdings
are multiples of two or three of those held by British households.13
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Table 5.8 Percentiles of U.K. Net Primary Housing Wealth and Stock Wealth, by
Home Ownership and Stock Ownership Status (BHPS 1995)
All Homeowners Stock Holders Homeowners with Stock
Percentile (100%) (65.6%) (24.0%) (20.7%)
Net Primary Housing Wealth
Mean 54.3 82.2 89.0 104.5
10 0.0 9.3 0.0 11.6
25 0.0 32.6 17.1 45.0
50 32.6 68.3 73.0 85.4
75 85.4 108.7 125.8 139.7
90 136.6 155.3 201.8 217.4
95 186.3 225.1 279.5 310.5
Stock Wealth (lower)
Mean 7.8 11.3 32.8 35.5
10 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.7
25 0.0 0.0 2.3 2.3
50 0.0 0.0 9.2 9.3
75 0.0 1.6 31.1 38.8
90 13.2 23.3 77.6 93.2
95 41.9 60.6 139.7 155.3
Stock Wealth (upper)
Mean 10.3 14.8 43.5 46.5
10 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.8
25 0.0 0.0 3.1 3.1
50 0.0 0.0 10.9 14.0
75 0.0 1.6 46.6 50.5
90 15.5 31.0 116.4 116.4
95 50.5 77.6 156.8 186.3
13. Banks, Blundell, and Smith (2000) show that the comparison between the 1995 BHPS
and the 1984 PSID reveals that, both for the full population of households and for share-The conditional distributions contained in tables 5.8 and 5.9 hint at a
greater separation of stock and housing holdings among British house-
holds. Among stockholders, the mean value of stock holdings in the
United Kingdom is only $3,000 higher if British households are also home-
owners. The “eﬀect” of home ownership on stock wealth is much higher in
the United States, especially among large stock values.
Tables 5.10 and 5.11 present means and medians of stock and housing
wealth by age band in the two countries, split according to whether house-
holds have stocks, housing wealth, or both. Looking at the patterns by age,
a striking diﬀerence emerges. Homeowners in the United Kingdom dem-
onstrate a substantial age gradient in their housing wealth, at both the
mean and median. Median net housing wealth for the forty–forty-nine-
year-olds is seven times higher than that for the twenty–twenty-nine-year-
olds. This gradient is much ﬂatter in the United States, with the correspon-
ding ratio being just over three. The reverse is true for stock wealth—the
age gradient of stock wealth for stock owners in the United Kingdom is
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Table 5.9 Percentiles of U.S. Net Primary Housing Wealth and Stock Wealth, by
Home Ownership and Stock Ownership Status (PSID 1994)
All Homeowners Stock Holders Homeowners with Stock
Percentile (100%) (62.6%) (34.1%) (27.6%)
Net Primary Housing Wealth
Mean 45.2 72.1 80.5 99.7
10 0.0 8.2 0.0 14.3
25 0.0 22.5 10.2 34.5
50 17.9 51.1 51.1 71.6
75 66.5 92.0 102.2 122.7
90 125.8 153.4 184.0 204.5
95 178.9 224.9 256.6 286.3
Stock Wealth
Mean 31.0 46.1 90.5 104.8
10 0.0 0.0 1.2 2.0
25 0.0 0.0 5.1 7.2
50 0.0 0.0 23.5 28.6
75 6.1 20.4 66.5 81.8
90 51.1 102.2 204.5 230.0
95 153.4 204.5 347.6 409.0
holders only, the distribution of share values held by households are virtually identical. That
is, after the stock market surge in both countries, British households had stock wealth simi-
lar to American households ten years earlier. In the early 1980s, however, we know that in
light of the subsequent extremely large increase in share ownership, British households’ stock
holdings were considerably smaller than their American counterparts. This initial condition
diﬀerence between the two countries would have profound impacts on wealth distributions by
the mid-1990s.Table 5.11 U.S. Net Primary Housing Wealth and Stock Wealth, by Age, Home Ownership,
and Stock Ownership Status (PSID 1994)
All  Homeowners  Stock Holders  Homeowners with 
(100%) (62.6%) (34.1%) Stock (27.6%)
Age Range Mean Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Housing Wealth
20–29 9.9 36.4 15.3 23.6 0.0 55.0 18.4
30–39 21.4 40.5 28.6 33.7 21.5 46.1 33.7
40–49 43.1 61.3 48.4 80.7 48.1 96.8 63.4
50–59 81.1 100.0 62.4 114.5 76.7 128.6 81.8
60–69 86.0 104.0 81.8 132.1 102.2 139.1 112.5
70  60.0 84.3 71.6 92.2 76.7 108.2 91.0
Stock Wealth
20–29 2.4 4.6 0.0 12.6 3.6 15.5 4.1
30–39 12.5 20.1 0.0 40.2 10.2 47.0 11.2
40–49 25.4 32.9 0.0 62.0 21.5 67.7 25.6
50–59 51.1 61.0 1.0 108.2 35.8 117.6 35.8
60–69 88.7 105.6 0.0 213.0 61.3 221.2 61.3
70  33.4 41.1 0.0 123.3 51.1 127.9 51.1
Table 5.10 Mean U.K. Net Primary Housing Wealth and Stock Wealth, by Age, Home
Ownership, and Stock Ownership Status (BHPS 1995)
All  Homeowners  Stock Holders  Homeowners with 
(100%) (65.6%) (24.0%) Stock (20.7%)
Age Range Mean Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Housing Wealth
20–29 6.3 16.7 10.9 5.6 3.1 10.3 11.6
30–39 26.8 38.7 31.0 36.6 24.8 43.5 31.0
40–49 63.3 82.7 68.3 95.2 69.9 104.5 74.5
50–59 83.7 109.6 96.3 122.2 112.9 131.2 121.1
60–69 82.1 119.5 93.2 117.4 105.6 143.9 132.0
70  57.4 104.2 86.9 112.0 100.9 139.0 108.7
Stock Wealth (lower)
20–29 1.5 1.8 0.0 10.2 4.7 9.5 3.7
30–39 3.9 5.1 0.0 15.0 5.4 16.0 5.8
40–49 6.1 7.5 0.0 23.2 7.8 24.1 7.8
50–59 11.0 13.5 0.0 32.4 9.3 32.6 10.9
60–69 15.3 21.4 0.0 55.4 20.2 65.5 38.8
70  8.2 15.4 0.0 50.7 10.1 57.0 115.5
Stock Wealth (upper)
20–29 1.6 2.0 0.0 10.7 4.7 10.2 3.7
30–39 4.7 6.2 0.0 17.9 6.2 19.3 6.2
40–49 7.5 9.3 0.0 28.5 9.3 29.6 9.3
50–59 18.0 20.0 0.0 53.0 15.5 48.1 15.5
60–69 19.5 27.2 0.0 70.0 30.0 83.3 50.5
70  9.8 18.9 0.0 60.8 12.4 69.7 15.5extremely shallow,14 whereas in the United States stock wealth rises by a
factor of almost ten for stock holders aged ﬁfty in comparison to those
aged twenty–twenty-nine. Looking at just those who own both homes and
stocks, the diﬀerences still emerge. It is these diﬀerences that we will ex-
plore in more detail later in the paper and that motivate the design of our
modeling exercise.
5.4 A Model of Housing Tenure Choice and Portfolio Decisions
5.4.1 The Demand for Housing Services
In the simplest model, housing demand is purely a function of family
size. It will therefore increase over the early period of the adult life cycle as
family size increases. In ﬁgure 5.4, we present proﬁles for house size, with
each line representing a thirty-year time series of the average number of
rooms for a year-of-birth cohort over the time period 1968–98. The ﬁgure
shows that in the United Kingdom there is a strong increase in house size,
as measured by the number of rooms, as the head of household grows older,
ﬂattening out around age forty but rising steeply from the twenties to the
thirties. For this reason we can frame our discussion in terms of a stylized
model with three stages in an early adult life cycle: leaving home, living as
a couple without children, and living as a couple with children. There is also
little evidence of strong cohort eﬀects during the early part of the adult life
cycle, as evidenced by the lack of vertical diﬀerences between each cohort’s
proﬁles up to age forty. Hence this rise is the same whether we look at the
individual date of birth cohorts, as in the ﬁgure, or pool across cohorts.
In general, housing demand will also depend on the unit price of ser-
vices, the level of (expected) wealth, and the degree of uncertainty over all
these variables. It is likely that demand for housing services is price inelas-
tic. Consequently, expenditure on housing services will be increasing in the
price of housing services. According to our numbers, the median value of
a U.S. owned home in 1994 is about 14 percent less than the median price
(value) of a U.K. owned home. Unless we think that there is 14 percent
more utility involved, this is evidence of a higher unit price in the United
Kingdom. A higher unit price in the United Kingdom will induce a higher
level of expenditure, conditional on all the other factors.
5.4.2 The Choice of Housing Tenure
At the start of the adult life cycle, housing tenure decisions occur in two
stages: ﬁrst, a choice of when to leave the parental home and second,
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14. Note that for stock wealth the mean proﬁles are substantially aﬀected by a cluster of ex-
tremely high-wealth young individuals. Age gradients at all but the 99th percentile and above
display the same increasing pattern as the median.whether to rent or to buy. Strictly speaking, the latter is not a portfolio de-
cision because, if a house is bought and continuously remortgaged, there
is no necessity to hold any housing equity. Yet, ownership is a prerequisite
for securing housing equity, and so the decision to own may be inﬂuenced
by portfolio choices as well as pure service-ﬂow considerations. A house
may also be owned without any desire to accumulate housing equity simply
because it is an eﬃcient way to achieve a desired ﬂow of housing services.
For a household with little expected mobility and heterogeneity of tastes,
owning can be the least costly way of achieving a desired level of housing
service.
Young households who ﬁrst decide to rent remain potential purchasers
of a starter home as soon as they are able to secure a down payment. In the
decision to leave the parental home, credit constraints will also play an im-
portant role as such constraints are typically binding on young adults who
must accumulate suﬃcient wealth to meet down payment and collateral re-
quirements. Consequently, the income of the young will be important, and
the volatility of incomes of young people rather than per capita income per
se, will be critical in generating swings in housing transactions.15 Higher
down payments lengthen the time required to build up enough wealth to
satisfy lenders and will make ﬁrst-time home buyers older, on average. Sim-
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Fig. 5.4 Average number of rooms over the life cycle, by age and cohort, from FES
data (1968–1998).
15. This also accords with the property ladder model of Ortalo-Magne and Rady (1998),
which views the housing market as a step-function.ilarly, inadequate rental markets may delay the age at which one leaves the
parental home but lower the age at which one buys the ﬁrst home. This last
point is explored, using the BHPS data used in our analysis, in Ermisch
(1999) who ﬁnds empirical support for the economic conditions of the
housing market relating to the household formation choices of the young
in Britain.
In light of the data in ﬁgure 5.4 and of empirical and theoretical models
of housing market dynamics (see, e.g., Di Salvo and Ermisch 1997 and
Ortalo-Magne and Rady 1998, respectively), the initial home purchase is
best seen as the ﬁrst step in a property ladder. If there is some job or de-
mographic mobility expected then, because of lower transaction costs, the
rental market may provide a less costly way of choosing an optimal path for
housing services. If house prices are variable, the rental market may also
provide a contract insuring against some of that risk. But by leaving equity
in their home, ﬁrst-time homeowners are partially self-insuring against
price ﬂuctuations in the housing market. While a price increase will raise
the price (and required down payment) on the second home, the price of
the ﬁrst home is also increasing, providing additional resources for that
now larger down payment. A symmetric argument obtains during periods
of housing price declines.
As incomes and family sizes grow, these now slightly older young adults
hope to buy a larger, more expensive home. The time interval between
these purchases is once again governed by the length of time it takes to se-
cure the larger down payment needed on the bigger house. Low down pay-
ment requirements will shorten the interval between home purchases. In
addition, any capital gains on the ﬁrst house may be used to help buy the
second. Capital gains during booms will tend to shorten the time interval
between the ﬁrst and second home purchase, whereas capital losses during
downturns will lengthen this interval.
5.4.3 House Price Uncertainty and the Choice 
between Stock and Housing Equity
Each household has a desired level of total wealth. This level will depend
on expected future income and consumption streams as well as the returns
on assets. First, consider the portfolio demand for housing equity. If house
prices are variable and uncertain then, given the increased demand over the
early part of the life cycle, housing equity will be an important source of in-
surance against house price risk. The larger the uncertainty in house prices
and the steeper the demand over the life cycle, the more important is the in-
surance aspect of housing equity.
Conditional on being an owner, therefore, the higher the level of house
price uncertainty the larger the demand to pay down the mortgage and to
hold wealth in housing equity. This will be particularly the case for house-
holds early in their life cycle as they anticipate stepping up the property
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face housing price volatility to invest their assets in the stock market even
if stock price and housing price risks are uncorrelated.
The tax treatment of mortgage repayments will also inﬂuence the level
of mortgage held and the desire to hold equity in housing. A tax advantage
to borrowing via a mortgage will make it optimal to consume more hous-
ing services and to use ownership as a vehicle for that consumption but not
necessarily to pay down the mortgage. Rather, it might be optimal to invest
in another risky asset rather than pay down the outstanding mortgage or
even to remortgage a housing equity capital gain.
5.4.4 The Supply of Housing Services
There are two aspects of the supply of housing services that are central
to our model. First, a more inelastic supply will induce a larger sensitivity
of house prices to ﬂuctuations in demand, in particular to ﬂuctuations in
the income of young, ﬁrst-time buyers. The second aspect relates to the
rental market. Imperfections and/or regulation of the private rental mar-
ket may make it diﬃcult for the young to use rental housing as the step be-
tween leaving the parental home and acquiring a house. The rental market
may also be dominated by the public sector in which case the allocation
mechanism may be less sensitive to the demand of young households.
A consequence of inelastic demand is that expenditure on housing ser-
vices will be increasing in the price of housing services.
5.4.5 Model Predictions
The model predictions for the United Kingdom relative to the United
States as households move through their early life-cycle proﬁle are clear.
The demand for housing services will increase as family size increases.
Consider the three stages of our stylized life-cycle proﬁle: leaving home,
living independently without children, and living with children. The model
predicts that the level of owner occupation at the second stage should be
lower in the United States relative to the United Kingdom if the deposit
and mobility motivations dominate the tax advantage. This is reinforced
by the higher house price volatility in the United Kingdom which makes
owner occupation more likely for those in the second stage of this life-cycle
proﬁle.
This prediction could also be rationalized by an ineﬃcient rental market
in the United Kingdom. However, the arguments also suggest that the
United Kingdom would have a higher level of housing equity for volatility
reasons but that this would be reduced once full household size is reached
at stage three in the early life-cycle proﬁle because the positive volatility
eﬀect would disappear. Other things being equal, the tax advantage in the
United States would make households more likely to be owners in the
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mulate housing equity.
The higher volatility in the United Kingdom increases the desire to hold
housing equity in the United Kingdom for those households in the second
stage of their demographic proﬁle, that is, those who expect to increase
their family size. In turn, this increases the desire to be an owner for such
households in the United Kingdom. We expect more owners and a higher
paying down of outstanding housing debt in the United Kingdom and a
higher level of housing equity in the United Kingdom. The latter, but not
the former, of these is predicted by the tax advantage.
5.5 The Housing Market and Income Risk of the Young
5.5.1 The Housing Market
Our model on housing markets places great weight on the role of young
households and on the role of housing and stock in portfolios over the life
cycle. To evaluate whether the young merit such an emphasis, we examine
individuals who purchased a new home between waves of the PSID and
BHPS samples. Across all ages, about one in twenty household heads in
both countries are observed to have bought a new home since the previous
wave of the panel. It is also clear that young people were far more active in
the housing market. For example, 12 percent of British household heads be-
tween the ages of twenty and twenty-nine had bought a new home during
the last year. The comparable number in the United States was 9 percent.
Table 5.12 lists the age distribution of household heads who purchased
a home between the annual waves of each survey.16 Besides describing all
home buyers, these data are stratiﬁed by whether household heads were
“ﬁrst-time” buyers or “repeat” buyers. Repeat buyers represent those who
had lived in a home that they owned before this new purchase, whereas
ﬁrst-time buyers were not living in a home that they had personally owned
right before this new purchase.17
Consistent with our view that they constitute the active part of the hous-
ing market, new home buyers are much younger than the average home-
owner.18 Moreover, the typical purchaser of a new home is a good deal
younger in the United Kingdom than in the United States. For example, 63
percent of all new buyers in the United Kingdom are less than forty years
old with a median age of thirty-ﬁve. The comparable numbers for the
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16. To provide adequate sample sizes on home buyers, the data were pooled across years.
17. More precisely, “ﬁrst-time” buyers consist of those who lived in a rental house in the
previous survey wave and those who lived in an owned home with their parents.
18. For example, in 1994 the mean age of all homeowners was 50.4 in the United Kingdom
and 51.3 in the United States.United States are 57 percent and a median age of thirty-seven. The diﬀer-
ences between the two countries are most striking among those household
heads between the ages of twenty and twenty-nine, who constitute 30 per-
cent of all new U.K. buyers compared to 22 percent in the United States.
First-time buyers are especially young, with median ages of only thirty
(United Kingdom) and thirty-four (United States). Household heads less
than thirty years old comprise almost half (47 percent) of all ﬁrst time buy-
ers in Britain, much higher than the comparable U.S. proportion of about
one-third (32 percent). Not surprisingly, repeat buyers are somewhat older
in both countries, but even here the median ages are only thirty-eight
(United Kingdom) and forty-one (United States). More than half of repeat
home buyers in the United Kingdom are less than forty years old.
Age is one dimension in which new home buyers diﬀer in the two coun-
tries.19 Table 5.13 tries to illuminate an additional dimension by listing
prevalence rates of new owners by their joint ownership and headship sta-
tus in the previous survey wave. A similar fraction of new buyers in both
countries had owned their own home in the prior wave. The principal dif-
ference emerges in the third column where there exists a far greater fraction
of American households who made a transition from renting a place of
their own to buying one. These intercountry diﬀerences are especially large
among young people (aged twenty–twenty-nine). In particular, 64 percent
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Table 5.12 Age Distribution of Home Buyers (%)
All Buyers First Time Buyers Repeat Buyers
Age U.K. U.S. U.K. U.S. U.K. U.S.
20–29 30.1 21.5 47.4 31.6 15.7 9.9
30–39 32.5 35.8 26.8 36.2 37.3 35.3
40–49 16.0 19.8 9.7 16.4 21.3 23.7
50–59 9.2 9.8 5.3 7.6 12.4 12.3
60–69 5.5 7.5 3.6 4.6 7.1 10.8
70  6.7 5.7 7.2 3.6 6.2 8.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Median 35.0 37.0 30.0 34.0 38.0 41.0
Mean 39.3 41.1 35.9 37.6 42.2 45.1
Notes:Rows for each country should add up to 100.0. Sample comprised of home buyers who
are heads in period t; all years pooled.
19. As documented in section 5.3, over recent years the relative tax status of housing and
stock wealth has been changing markedly. Broadly speaking, both assets are now taxed neu-
trally with respect to current consumption, while in the past housing was tax-favored, and
wealth held in the form of stocks was tax-penalized. In contrast, since the introduction of
IRAs both assets have received a relatively stable tax treatment in the United States.of new buyers in this age group in the United States were previously house-
hold heads who were renters. The comparable British ﬁgure is only one-
quarter. The counterweight is the large fraction of young home buyers in
Britain who were not heads of household in the prior year (55 percent in
the United Kingdom compared to 16 percent in the United States). These
young British nonhousehold heads were more than twice as likely to live in
an owned as opposed to a rented home—it was simply not a home that
they owned.
Among those who had lived previously in an owned home, the dominant
situation for those between the ages of twenty and twenty-nine was that
they departed the parental home. While this is true for both countries, this
is a far larger group of young people in the United Kingdom than it is in
the United States. A key diﬀerence between the two countries concerns
what happens when a young person ﬁrst leaves the parental home. Across
the years we examined, about one-ﬁfth of British adults aged twenty–
twenty-nine who were living in the parental home moved out the next year.
The U.S. number is only slightly larger (about one-fourth). While the likeli-
hood of leaving the parental home was roughly similar, where these British
and American young adults went could not have been more diﬀerent. This
is illustrated in table 5.14, which shows that almost half of all young adults
aged twenty–twenty-nine in Britain who left the parental nest bought their
own home. In sharp contrast, this fraction is only 18 percent in the United
States. While much smaller numbers are making this transition among
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Table 5.13 Make Up of New Homebuyers, by Age
Status in Previous Year
Head and Nonhead in an Head and Nonhead in a
Age Range Owner Owned House Renter Renter House All
United Kingdom
20–29 0.196 0.380 0.250 0.174 100.0
30–39 0.530 0.132 0.261 0.077 100.0
40–49 0.615 0.125 0.210 0.051 100.0
50–59 0.639 0.102 0.252 0.007 100.0
60–69 0.625 0.080 0.250 0.045 100.0
70  0.449 0.065 0.467 0.019 100.0
United States
20–29 0.202 0.125 0.635 0.038 100.0
30–39 0.439 0.030 0.517 0.014 100.0
40–49 0.538 0.023 0.422 0.017 100.0
50–59 0.575 0.010 0.396 0.019 100.0
60–69 0.657 0.015 0.320 0.008 100.0
70  0.639 0.026 0.329 0.005 100.0
Note: Sample comprised of home buyers who are heads in period t; all years pooled.those aged thirty–thirty-nine, the diﬀerences in the type of transition be-
tween the two countries remain.20
The data in this section document the following important diﬀerences
between new home buyers in the United Kingdom and the United States.
New home buyers are disproportionately very young adults with a partic-
ularly pronounced tilt toward the young in Britain. When they leave their
parents’ home, Americans ﬁrst tend to live in rental housing either on their
own or with their spouse or partner. No doubt due to diﬃculties in the
British rental market, when British youth leave their parents they tend to
skip over this intermediate step and go immediately on to purchasing their
own house. Finally, these trends have interacted with massive composi-
tional changes in household population so that increasing fractions of
young homeowners are not currently married.
5.5.2 Income Risk
Our emphasis on the young also points to a potentially important role
for income risk in this model. There are two aspects of income risk that will
be useful to distinguish. The ﬁrst is the systematic variation in aggregate
ﬁrst-time buyer income or shocks to income. As we noted previously, it is
this that generates variation in the demand for ﬁrst-time purchases. The
second possible measure of income variance is the level of within-period
income risk for each age group. We focus on the former since the latter will
act as background risk and will only indirectly aﬀect the demand curve
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Table 5.14 Proportion of Those Moving Out of Family Home Who Become Owners,
by Age
Age Range United Kingdom United States
20–29 0.466 0.180
30–39 0.557 0.231
All ages 0.486 0.191
Note: Sample comprised of all adults who are child of head in t – 1 and not child of head in t;
all years pooled.
20. Another key demographic phenomenon—the delay, decline, and disruption of mar-
riage, especially among the young—was also aﬀecting the attributes of homeowners. In 1969,
98 percent of British home owners less than thirty years old were married. Thirty years later,
one-third of young British home owners were not currently married. These rates currently ap-
pear similar within age groups in the two countries, but because there are more young home-
owners in Britain, there are far more unmarried homeowners there. This large and growing
fraction of young home owners who are not currently married may be another important ele-
ment of the story. One impact of marriage is that it is an individual income risk reducing in-
stitution as one partner insures the other against the vagaries of life. With increasing numbers
of young householders not currently married, they may be exposed to more income risk even
if the structure of income risk by age did not change.through risk aversion. A higher level of the ﬁrst will create ﬂuctuations in
the price of housing provided supply is inelastic.
To investigate this we need to examine whether the variation of the age-
speciﬁc aggregate shocks is larger for the young. The framework we adopt
follows Banks, Blundell, and Brugiavini (2001) and separates aggregate
from idiosyncratic risk. To estimate the aggregate variance for each age
band, we regress average log income for each cohort on its lagged value for
the same cohort and a list of changes in observable demographic charac-
teristics. We then compute the variance of the time- and cohort-speciﬁc
income shocks from this regression for each age group. The results of this
regression using the repeated cross sections from the U.K. Family Expen-
diture Survey (FES) (1978–99) are presented in table 5.15.
In a simple liquidity constrained model, the variance of income itself,
rather than the variance of income shocks, would determine ﬂuctuations in
demand. A comparison of the two measures of the aggregate variance for
broad age bands in the United Kingdom is presented in the ﬁrst two col-
umns of table 5.16. For both measures there is a steep decline in aggregate
income variation as we move from households whose heads are in their
twenties to those households where the heads are in the thirties age band.
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Table 5.15 Log Income Model for the United Kingdom: Quarterly Income by
Cohort (1968–1992)
Variable Coeﬃcient Standard Error
Log income (t – 1) 1.0070 0.0088
  number employed 0.1277 0.0500
  number adults 0.7455 0.0344
  number children 0.0534 0.0288





Notes:IV estimation using lagged variables as instruments. Household income equivalized by
the number of adults.
Table 5.16 Measures of the Variance of Log Income in the United Kingdom, by Age
Group (1968–1992)
Aggregate Variance Aggregate Variance Within Age Group
Age of Income of Income Shocks Income Variance
20s 0.0263 0.0074 0.2301
30s 0.0155 0.0034 0.2362
40s 0.0185 0.0049 0.2713Note that the level of income variation rises systematically over time, es-
pecially in the 1980s, so that younger cohorts face a higher aggregate vari-
ation than older cohorts did at the same age. Finally, note that our measure
of risk for the young may be an underestimate because the young will pre-
sumably also face more risk as a result of uncertainty about future demo-
graphics and household formation.
5.6 How Well Does the Model Explain the Data?
The model developed in section 5.4 was motivated by a number of facts
relating to housing tenure choice, to housing equity, and to the stock of
wealth holdings by households over their life cycle in the United Kingdom
and the United States. In this section we ask whether the model can pro-
vide a convincing explanation and whether it can do better than other com-
peting explanations.
5.6.1 Implications of the Model
The principal implications of our model stem from the signiﬁcantly
higher volatility of house prices in the United Kingdom. This starting
point is fundamental, and we have two underlying explanations for it.
First, the supply of housing is likely to be more inelastic in the United
Kingdom, in part due to the greater population density there. This is most
clearly seen in the dominance of the greater London area in the British
housing market. Around 30 percent of all homes in England are located
within the Southeast (including Greater London). Not only is the available
space limited there, but new housing construction or conversion is heavily
regulated and costly to build. This more inelastic supply implies that for
any given demand side ﬂuctuations, housing prices will be more volatile in
the United Kingdom than in the United States.
Second, house prices are more sensitive to the variation in ﬁrst-time
buyer demand and therefore the volatility of ﬁrst-time buyer incomes. Be-
cause new British home buyers are younger and therefore positioned on
the more volatile part of the income risk–age curve, income ﬂuctuations in-
ducing demand side swings will also contribute to the greater price volatil-
ity in the British housing market.
In addition to more volatile prices, down payment requirements are less
onerous in the United Kingdom, and the rental market is less eﬃcient. In
our model, these conditions all conspire to lead young U.K. households to
move into owner occupation rather than to rent and to do this at an earlier
age. This pattern of home ownership is borne out by the data. We ﬁnd a
signiﬁcantly lower use of the rental market in the United Kingdom among
younger households and a much higher probability in the United Kingdom
of transiting from parental home to owner occupation. Of those adults
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BHPS, 46.6 percent became owner-occupiers directly, as opposed to only
15.0 percent for their PSID counterparts. Although the group is much
smaller, similar diﬀerences pertain for the thirty–thirty-nine age group.
Our model also had implications for portfolio choice. The higher house
price volatility in the United Kingdom makes it optimal for those young
households who expect to move up the property ladder to hold housing eq-
uity. Young homeowners in the United Kingdom who plan to upgrade
their housing by purchasing a larger, newer home as their incomes and
families expand may face considerable housing price risk. One method of
self-insuring against housing price volatility would be to maintain a large
fraction of household wealth in housing equity thereby matching possible
variation in the value of one’s current home with the price of any desired
home upgrade.21 In contrast, a quite risky strategy among young home-
owners would be to hold much of their wealth in stock. Even if housing
price and stock price risks are uncorrelated, a downturn in the equity mar-
ket could make it quite diﬃcult for young homeowners (who have limited
amounts of household wealth) to reach their down payment goals for the
new home.
For young U.K. households facing higher house price risk and lower
down payment requirements, the model predicts that they enter the hous-
ing owning market earlier, cover a very large percentage of the house price
by mortgage, and then pay down the mortgage as a saving instrument for
future movements up the property ladder. Early in their adult life cycle we
would expect to see a higher proportion of young owner-occupier house-
holds in the United Kingdom. At this point they would have little equity in
housing and hold relatively large mortgages. But as they move through the
early part of their adult life cycle they would, rather, accumulate housing
equity than stock. Consequently, we predict that compared to the United
States, in the United Kingdom age gradients in housing equity will be
steeper and in stock equity less in the early part of the life cycle. From ﬁg-
ure 5.4 we might expect this comparison to be particularly strong in the
twenties and thirties and then to dampen out in the forties and ﬁfties as the
property ladder reaches a plateau.
The housing and stock wealth numbers reported in tables 5.10 and 5.11
would appear to be most relevant for testing these predictions. Tables 5.10
and 5.11 show, as predicted, that U.K. households indeed have a much
steeper gradient in the accumulation of wealth in housing equity. The
strong gradient for U.K. households is evident in both the mean and the
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21. The downside of this risk, the so-called “negative equity” phenomenon that was wide-
spread in the late 1980s and early 1990s, is only a problem if households cannot meet the
monthly mortgage payments and are forced out of the market by repossession.median of housing wealth in the ﬁrst panel of table 5.10. The model also
implies that the gradient should be even steeper among homeowners, es-
pecially those facing high housing price risk. Mean housing wealth rises by
a factor of two between the twenties and thirties and then again by the
same factor between the thirties and forties for homeowners in the United
Kingdom. The reverse is true for stock wealth. Compared to the United
States, the United Kingdom shows little gradient in stock wealth for those
households early in their adult life cycle. For stock, due to a few large out-
liers, the median is probably a more robust measure, but even for the me-
dian there is little evidence of a gradient in the United Kingdom. In the
United States the gradient in stock wealth is even more striking than it is
for housing wealth in the United Kingdom.
5.6.2 Biases in Age Gradients for the Portfolios of the Young
There are potential problems with our reliance on the data in tables 5.10
and 5.11. First, cohort eﬀects that we have seen are quite real in housing,
and equity markets may confound them. Second, they describe the pattern
of wealth holdings by age of household heads and many young adults are
in households headed by their parents and thus appear in households with
older heads.
Cohort Eﬀects
The data in tables 5.10 and 5.11 are cross-sectional age proﬁles and may
be contaminated by year and cohort eﬀects. If cohort and time eﬀects are
the same across the two countries, our comparisons of age proﬁles may be
less aﬀected by this issue than for each individual country age proﬁle. Yet
the evidence in tables 5.2 and 5.6—listing ownership age proﬁles by coun-
try and year—suggests this may not be the case.
There are two types of cohort-year eﬀects that may well aﬀect our com-
parisons. The ﬁrst are unique events that diﬀerentially aﬀected the incen-
tives to own homes or stocks in the two countries. The second results from
the possible contamination of home and stock equity age proﬁles due to
capital gains.
We ﬁrst examine the impact of capital gains. For stocks, average rate of
returns have been high and approximately the same in both countries, but
there remains a possibility that middle-aged American cohorts beneﬁted
by being diﬀerentially exposed to the stock market (in comparison to the
United Kingdom) in the mid-1980s. Fortunately, because questions are in-
cluded on new stock purchases and sales we are able, in the United States
data, to separate out that part of wealth accumulation in stock that is due
to capital gains. To examine the impact of capital gains, we list in the ﬁrst
column of table 5.17 the cross-sectional holdings of stock wealth by age in
the United States in 1984. The next column labeled shows the actual stock
wealth of these 1984 age groups ten years later. The large within-cohort in-
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in stocks. While these adjusted proﬁles indicate a much less steep pure life-
cycle increase in stock wealth, even the capital gains adjusted data for the
United States exhibit a larger age gradient than the unadjusted U.K. age
gradient. Because the British stock age gradient is also exaggerated by cap-
ital gains, we conclude that the steeper U.S. age gradient for stock wealth
is not solely a consequence of capital gains in stocks. For housing, however,
the time series of returns suggests that over the period as a whole (particu-
larly to 1994) returns were similar in both countries but more volatile in the
United Kingdom.
In addition to the impact of diﬀerential capital gains, there are other co-
hort-year eﬀects that diﬀerentially impact both stock and housing markets
in the United Kingdom. However, these year eﬀects are speciﬁc to a very
narrow time period, allowing us to control for their impact. For example,
the large increase in stock ownership rates in the United Kingdom due to
the ﬂotation of national industries was concentrated during the time pe-
riod 1984–89. By limiting our comparisons to the post-1989 period, we can
minimize the impact of this eﬀect. We do so in table 5.18 by listing in the
ﬁrst column 1989 age proﬁles of stock ownership in both countries. In the
adjacent column are listed the ownership rates of these age groups ten
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Table 5.17 Fraction of U.S. Change in Stock Wealth between 1984 and 1994 Due to
Capital Gains
Realized Realized Adjusted for
Age Range 1984 1994 Capital Gains
20–29 0.9 12.5 7.0
30–39 4.8 25.4 15.1
40–49 8.7 51.1 23.7
50–59 19.6 88.7 42.3
Table 5.18 Life-Cycle Changes in Stock Ownership (1989–1999)










50–59 0.374 0.456years later. In all cases, there was a much more rapid buildup in stock own-
ership in the United States compared to the United Kingdom.
Household Composition
So far we have been considering age proﬁles of housing and stock wealth
computed by the age band of the head of the household. The head of the
household is in turn deﬁned by the owner of the property, and in the case
of joint ownership, the oldest of the joint owners. Given the higher fre-
quency of young adults living in households with older heads in the United
Kingdom, tables 5.10 and 5.11 could display serious diﬀerential bias in the
age pattern of housing and stock holdings of the United Kingdom relative
to the United States. These biases apply to a considerably wider set of prob-
lems and relationships of interest than this one alone.
There are two potential biases due to household composition in looking
at diﬀerences in life-cycle age proﬁles across countries. The very notion of
a household (deﬁned by the age of the head) results in the consideration of
a selected sample. In both countries there will be young adults, at the be-
ginning of their life cycles, who are still in the parental home or in other
nonspousal living arrangements, many of whom will not be picked up in
our calculations in the appropriate age band. To the extent that this group
is diﬀerentially sized in the two countries the age proﬁles will be diﬀeren-
tially aﬀected.
Table 5.19 examines this issue by considering all adults in each age band
(as opposed to just household heads) and looking at the distribution of re-
lationships to the head of the household in which they live. Roughly one-
quarter of adults aged twenty–twenty-nine in each country are still living
with their parents (i.e., they are children of the head). But this is where the
similarities end. A higher proportion of young adults in the United King-
dom are married or cohabiting with the household head, considerably
fewer adults in the United Kingdom are actually household heads, and
considerably more are in “other” arrangements, where among the young
this group is predominantly made up of nonrelatives.
This means that the country-speciﬁc age proﬁles may well be inﬂuenced
by the fact that when working at the household level we do not count many
young individuals at the start of their life cycles. These children of house-
hold heads will crop up instead in our tables as members of the households
aged forty–forty-nine or ﬁfty–ﬁfty-nine. These omitted young adults from
the early age bands will tend to have lower housing (in fact zero) and stock
wealth so that age gradients will tend to be understated.
Table 5.19 indicates a second bias—there are substantially more single
heads of household among the young in the United States than in the
United Kingdom. Individuals in single and married households are treated
quite diﬀerently in a household unit analysis. The combined assets of the
238 James Banks, Richard Blundell, and James P. Smithtwo individuals in a married household are summed and treated as one.22
When there are many young married households, average assets are in-
ﬂated and the age gradient of wealth is aﬀected.23
The magnitude of the impacts of these biases on age proﬁles for wealth
will depend to some extent on the amounts of wealth held by each group
identiﬁed in table 5.19. The discussion above makes it clear that there is
some reason to believe that even if there were no underlying diﬀerences in
wealth between young heads and other young adults, we would still ob-
serve an unduly ﬂat age proﬁle. In fact, the situation is exacerbated because
young heads (particularly when coupled with their spouses) typically have
more assets than their peers. Taking data at the individual level once more
from the BHPS, the rate of stock ownership among young (twenty–twenty-
nine) heads and spouses is 14.7 percent, compared with 8.6 percent for
young adults living in the parental home. Correspondingly, asset stocks are
around 33 percent higher for this group also (“upper” estimates are $4,034
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Table 5.19 All Adults: Distribution of Relationships to Head of Household, 
by Age (%)
Married Cohabiting
Age Range Head Spouse Spouse Child Other Total
United Kingdom
20–29 37.3 17.6 11.2 25.0 9.0 100.0
30–39 55.7 33.7 5.5 4.0 1.1 100.0
40–49 58.9 35.9 2.7 2.0 0.7 100.0
50–59 62.6 33.8 1.7 1.0 1.0 100.0
60–69 66.0 31.4 0.6 0.3 1.6 100.0
70  80.6 25.8 0.4 0.0 3.2 100.0
All 58.1 28.1 4.3 6.5 3.0 100.0
United States
20–29 47.0 21.2 5.0 24.3 2.5 100.0
30–39 59.0 33.1 3.0 4.0 1.0 100.0
40–49 59.2 35.6 1.8 2.2 1.1 100.0
50–59 59.7 36.9 1.0 1.2 1.4 100.0
60–69 62.7 33.6 0.5 0.7 2.6 100.0
70  73.4 18.6 0.2 0.3 7.5 100.0
All 58.7 30.0 2.3 6.7 2.4 100.0
Note: Sample comprised of adults over age seventy; all years pooled.
22. Individuals in married households may also individually accumulate more wealth due
to marriage selection eﬀects (being more prudent) or if marriage encourages savings.
23. A further issue is that the way in which the BHPS data is collected; with asset stocks
asked individually and then questions about joint ownership following, one might expect this
to impact on the diﬀerence between our “upper” and “lower” bounds for the youngest age
group, in particular. We use the upper bounds in table 5.15.for heads, $3,120 for children of heads, and $612 for non-relatives; “lower”
estimates are $2,496, $1,160 and $545, respectively).
Using the U.K. data, in which asset values are actually collected from in-
dividual household members, we can begin to understand the importance
of such biases on our age–wealth proﬁles.24 In table 5.20 we recomputed
age proﬁles for stock in the United Kingdom on a tax unit and an individ-
ual basis, as opposed to a household basis. For the tax unit we deﬁne as sep-
arate units all adults except spouses as opposed to just looking at all
households. Spouses’ assets are added to those of the heads, and the com-
bined unit is counted only once. For the individual analysis, we divide the
assets in a married household by two and count each adult in an age band
as a distinct unit.
The ﬁnal two columns of table 5.20 repeat the household-level medians
from tables 5.10 and 5.11. The diﬀerences in age proﬁles across diﬀerent
types of units are not trivial. In particular, stock wealth is diﬀerentially
lower for the youngest tax units so that the resulting tax unit and individ-
ual age gradients are much steeper than household unit gradients. For ex-
ample, at a household unit in the United Kingdom the ratio of median
stock wealth of the sixty–sixty-nine age band is 6.4 times that of the
twenty–twenty-nine age band. The comparable U.K. number at the tax
unit or individual unit level is about 10.6. These ratios are suﬃciently
diﬀerent to raise serious questions about the sensitivity of tests of the life-
cycle model to the widespread use of household unit analysis. However, no
matter which U.K. unit of analysis is used, the stock age gradients are al-
ways much less than the household unit in the United States where the
comparable ratio of these two age groups is 17. The U.S. number itself
would be much higher at the tax or individual unit level. Thus, we conclude
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Table 5.20 The Eﬀect of Household Composition on Stock and Home Equity Age
Gradients: Median Values of Stocks (Stockholders), by Age (in
thousands of US$)
United Kingdom
Age Range Households Tax Units Individuals United States
20–29 4.7 3.1 1.6 3.6
30–39 6.2 4.7 3.0 10.2
40–49 9.3 9.0 4.7 21.5
50–59 15.5 15.6 7.8 35.8
60–69 30.0 32.6 17.1 61.3
70  12.4 15.6 8.1 51.1
24. Due to the data collection process in PSID, it is not possible to carry out this exercise
on the U.S. data.that while household composition is an extremely important issue, the bi-
ases it creates do not substantively aﬀect our conclusion that age gradients
of housing equity are steeper in the United Kingdom, while age gradients
of stocks are steeper in the United States.
5.6.3 Other Potential Explanations
This combination of diﬀerences in ownership and the gradient of stock
versus housing equity between the United Kingdom and United States
gives support to our proposed model. However, it may well be that there are
many other explanations of the same phenomena that could perform
equally well. We now turn to these. The ﬁrst and most obvious potential
candidate for these diﬀerences between the United Kingdom and the
United States is the tax diﬀerentials, that is, the possibility that the prefer-
ential treatment of mortgage debt in the United States could drive all the
observed diﬀerences in net housing wealth. It is certainly true that tax
diﬀerences can explain why homeowners in the United States maintain a
relatively large mortgage debt. However, such a diﬀerence in tax advan-
tages will also make ownership more attractive over renting, thus making
it diﬃcult to explain the high demand for home ownership in the United
Kingdom, relative to the United States, among young households.
A second possibility is that rental market ineﬃciencies alone could drive
the observed diﬀerences. In this case, rental market ineﬃciencies could ex-
plain the lower use of the rental sector among younger households in the
United Kingdom. However, such an explanation taken on its own cannot
explain why, once one is an owner, there is a strong demand in the United
Kingdom for one to pay down the mortgage and to save heavily in housing
equity.
A third potential explanation is that the right-to-buy policy is in line
with the predictions of our model because it makes home ownership more
attractive for lower- to middle-income groups in the United Kingdom.
These are certainly people who can be expected to want to insure against
house price risk. However, they will typically not be the young. The right-
to-buy is available to existing public sector renters; consequently, it was
most important in getting middle-aged public sector renters to move into
home ownership in the mid-1980s when the policy was enacted.
Finally, we consider the possibility that diﬀerences are driven solely by
diﬀerences in the ﬁxed costs or transactions costs associated with stock
ownership. Extensive privatization and demutualization in the United
Kingdom over this period created many middle-income stock owning
households who typically held very small values of one or two privatized
stocks. This could explain the relatively low share of wealth held in stock
in the United Kingdom, but again it cannot explain the high fraction of
wealth held in housing equity and why this is particularly the case among
the young.
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tors could be combining to yield the observed international diﬀerences in
age gradients across the dimensions we have identiﬁed in our analysis. The
full evaluation of this possibility and the corresponding inferences about
the role of risk in housing decisions, in comparison to the role of tax in-
centives or the failure of the rental market, for example, is left as an im-
portant topic for future research in understanding U.S.-U.K. diﬀerences in
household wealth portfolios.
5.7 Conclusions
In this paper we have attempted to address an interesting housing equity
puzzle. Why do younger households in the United Kingdom accumulate so
much of their wealth in housing equity rather than diversifying in stock as
is true for their U.S. counterparts? In trying to address this puzzle we have
built up a detailed picture of housing choices and wealth accumulation in
both countries. Using available microdata sources, we have documented
how this has evolved for diﬀerent age groups, for diﬀerent demographic
groups, and for diﬀerent education groups in both countries. We have
shown that young adults in the United Kingdom leave their parental home
later than in the United States, and when they do leave they are much more
likely to become a homeowner rather than use the rental market. Once a
homeowner they are much more likely to accumulate wealth in housing eq-
uity rather than in other investment instruments.
Why so? Is it just the diﬀerential tax treatment of mortgages or the diﬀer-
ent institutional structures of the housing and stock markets in the two
countries? We argue that although these diﬀerences are real and can go
some way to explaining the observed facts, something more is needed. The
higher volatility of house prices in the United Kingdom was the clue. We
derived a modeling framework that explains the higher volatility and uses
this to explain the diﬀerent gradients in housing equity and stock holdings
across the countries. Importantly, this model separates three dimensions of
housing wealth outcomes—the demand for housing services, the owner
occupation decision, and the housing equity decision.
The ineﬃcient rental market places many more U.K. households in the
owner-occupier sector at an earlier age than in the United States. The
higher volatility of house prices in the United Kingdom adds to this incen-
tive because, for those expecting to move up the house-size ladder, housing
equity is an eﬃcient insurance vehicle for house price uncertainty. The only
way to invest in housing equity is to become an owner. Once an owner, this
insurance mechanism increases the incentive to hold a higher proportion
of wealth in housing equity rather than in some other risky asset. Where
house prices are less volatile, as in the United States, this incentive is much
reduced. Consequently, as households age and wish to accumulate wealth,
242 James Banks, Richard Blundell, and James P. Smiththey will do this more through housing equity in the United Kingdom than
in the United States. We predict a higher gradient in the accumulation of
stock in the United States and conversely a high gradient in the accumula-
tion of housing equity in the United Kingdom, precisely the “puzzle” we
see in the data and a fact that alternative explanations have diﬃculty pre-
dicting.
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Appendix
Table 5A.1 Comparisons of PSID and BHPS Asset Categories
PSID BHPS
1. Other Real Estate—second home, land, rental  1.  Value of second home
real estate, money owed in land contract
2. Net Vehicle Equity—wheels, cars, trucks,  2.  Net value of car(s)
motor home, trailers, boats
3. Net Equity in farm or business 3.  Not available
4. Stocks—corporate, mutual funds, investments  4.  “Investments”: stocks, shares, mutual funds 
trusts, stocks in IRAs and investment trusts, bonds
5. Checking, savings accounts, funds in IRAs,  5.  Savings in accounts at bank, building society, 
money market funds, treasury bills, CDs including TESSAs
6. Other Savings—bonds, life insurance, valu- 6.  Not available
ables, trust or estate rights
7. Other Debts—credit card, student loans, loans  7.  Other loans outstanding: credit card, bank 
from relatives, medical or legal bills loan, hire purchase, store card, credit union, 
etc.
8. Net Home Equity (home value—all 8a. Value of residence
mortgages) 8b. Outstanding mortgage on all property
Net Financial Assets:
4   5   6 – 7 4   5 – 7
Net Worth:
1   2   3   8   Net Financial Assets 1   2   8   Net Financial Assets
Questionnaire Methods:
Unfolding brackets 1: banded
2, 8a, 8b: value requested
4, 5, 7: value requested, then unfolding brackets
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Comment John B. Shoven
This is a tremendously valuable paper with lots of interesting facts and an
innovative model to explain them. The paper compares the portfolio hold-
ings of British and American households. They ﬁnd a signiﬁcant number
of noteworthy diﬀerences: (1) British households have greater home equity
in both absolute and relative terms in their portfolios, (2) wealth is more
concentrated in the United States, (3) American households hold more ﬁ-
nancial assets in their portfolios, particularly those higher up in the wealth
distribution, (4) direct participation in equity markets is greater in the
United States than in Britain, but British participation increased in the
1980s, (5) homeownership increased in the United Kingdom in the 1980s,
particularly among the middle aged and relatively uneducated, (6) home-
ownership is much higher among young adults in the United Kingdom
than in the United States, (7) housing prices are higher and have been much
more volatile in the United Kingdom, (8) down payment requirements for
homes are much lower in the United Kingdom, (9) mortgage interest is not
tax deductible in the United Kingdom as it is in the United States, and (10)
U.S. and U.K. equity markets performed similarly between 1979 and 1999.
That is quite a list of facts, and Banks, Blundell, and Smith deserve credit
for highlighting them and developing a model that can explain many of
them.
The facts that the authors concentrate on are that young people in the
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a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research.United Kingdom are much more likely to own a house, they accumulate
housing equity more rapidly, and they are much less likely to participate in
equity markets. The authors relate these facts to others, particularly the
lower down payment requirements and the more volatile housing prices in
the United Kingdom. In their model, young people desire to trade up in
housing as they age and as their families get larger. With volatile housing
prices, a way to partially insure against price changes in the larger house
you desire in the future is to own a smaller house in the same market. The
assumption is that house prices are much more closely correlated with
other houses in the same market than they are with equity returns. In such
a situation, saving for your next house by investing in equities is far riskier
than saving by accumulating equity in your own home. Once you purchase
a home, paying down the mortgage is advantageous in the United King-
dom because of the lack of mortgage interest deductibility. In the United
States, with less volatile housing prices, with a better rental market, and
with mortgage interest deductibility, the pattern of homeownership is quite
diﬀerent. I found the Banks, Blundell, and Smith model quite ingenious in
that (1) it makes sense, and (2) it implies that riskier house prices actually
stimulate the demand for owner occupation.
Banks, Blundell, and Smith have some explanations for why house prices
are more volatile in the United Kingdom (e.g., lower supply elasticity due
to higher population density), but they don’t explain why down payment
requirements on homes are lower in the United Kingdom. One would
think that lending institutions would require higher down payments in
more volatile markets. So, one question that they left unanswered was
whether the higher downpayment requirements in the United States were
the result of some form of market failure.
A bigger problem that I have with the paper is that it is diﬃcult to put the
portfolio diﬀerences between the United States and the United Kingdom
into perspective when the paper only includes information on the two
countries being examined. It isn’t surprising that portfolio behavior is
diﬀerent in the United Kingdom and the United States; the more interest-
ing question is whether these diﬀerences are unusually large. For instance,
how do the observed diﬀerences compare with California versus Idaho, the
United Kingdom versus Sweden, or the United States versus Canada? I am
still wondering whether the United States and the United Kingdom are
more similar than most countries or regions, or more diﬀerent.
Another matter worthy of further study is the extent to which private
portfolio diﬀerences reﬂect diﬀerent government policies. The two coun-
tries diﬀer in whether they oﬀer public health insurance, in the cost of
higher education, and in the public and private retirement systems. Private
saving and portfolios presumably reﬂect the diﬀerent government and in-
stitutional policies in the two countries. Are the tastes and preferences of
Americans and the British similar, with their behavior diﬀerences simply
Wealth Portfolios in the United Kingdom and the United States 245reﬂecting the diﬀerent institutional environments in which they live? I
couldn’t answer this question from reading the paper.
Despite my desire for even more analysis and information, I think that
this paper adds a lot to the literature. It identiﬁes some of the signiﬁcant
factors accounting for the portfolio diﬀerences between U.S. and U.K.
households. In fact, it is so successful that I hope that these or other re-
searchers will ask these same questions for additional countries and re-
gions of the world. Then we will learn whether the United Kingdom and
the United States are really that (relatively) diﬀerent.
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